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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE COUNTY, ET AL.,
Respondents,

-vs.-

Case No. 9207

UTAH LIQUOR CO·NTRO·L COMMISSION, ET AL.,
Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

S TATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the statement of
as contained in appellant's brief.
1

fact~

STATE1fENT OF POINTS
POIN'T I
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS SUBJECT
TO SUIT FOR VIO·LATION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY ZONING REGULATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ;TITLE
17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953, AS IT APPLIES TO VIOLATION OF
THE PROVISIONS OF TIT'LE 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, AS
AMENDED.
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POINT II
THE APP AREN'T CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE PROVI,.."
SIONS OF TITLE 32~1-28 AND 'TITLE 17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953,
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE LATTER, IT
BEING THE MOS'T RECENT EXPRESSIO·N OF THE LEGISLATURE.
POINT III
HAVING FAILED TO ~co~MPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 17-27-8, U;C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED, THE
USE OF T'HE LAND AND BUILDINGS IN QUES'TION BY
THE LIQUOR •CONTROL COMMISSION IS ENJOINABLE,
AND 'THE TRIAL COURT RULING DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTIO·N TO DISMISS RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT HEREIN SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
POINT IV
·THE LIQUOR CONTROL COl\1!diSSION ACTS IN A PROPRIETARY RATHER THAN A GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY, AND IS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO ZONING REGULATIO·NS.
ARGlJ~IENT

POIN·T I
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS SUBJECT
TO SUIT FOR VIO·LATION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY ZONING REGULATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE
17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953, AS IT APPLIES TO VIOLATION OF
THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, AS
AMENDED.

Title 1.7-27-23, lT.C.A., 1953, provides as follows:
"It shall be unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, maintain or use any building or
structure or to use any land in violation of any
regulation in, or any provision of, any zoning
resolution, or any amendment thereof, enacted or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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adopted by any board of county commissioners
under the authority of the act. Any person, firm
or corporation violating any regulation in, or
of any provision of, any zoning resolution, or any
amendment of this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. In case any build~ng or structure i~s or
is proposed to be erected, constructed, reconstructed, altered, maintained or used, or any land
is or is proposed to be used, in violation of this
.act or of any reg~tlation or prqvision of any resolution, or amend1nent thereof, ~enacted, or adopted
by any board of county commiJssioners under the
authority granted by this act, such board, the
district atotrney of the ·county, or any owner of
real estate within the district in which such building, structure or land is situated, may, in addition to other remedies provided by law, i'nsti·tute
injunction, mandamus, abatement or any other
appropriate action or actions, proceeding or proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate or remove such
unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction,
alteration, maintenance or use." (Emphasis added.)
One of the provisions of the act to which the foregoing section of the statute applies is Title 17-27-8,
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, referred t o by appellant in his
brief in Point III, and set out as follows:
1

"vVnenever any board of county commissioners shall have adopted an official map of the
county or any part thereof, then and thenceforth
no public road, park or other public way, ground,
or space, no public building or structure, or no
public utility, whether publicly or privately owned, shall be constructed or authorized in the unincorporated territory of the county until and
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unless the proposed location and extent thereof
shall have been submitted to and approved by
such county planning commission; provided, ho\rever, that in case of disapproval, the said planning commission shall communicate its reasons
to the board of county commissioners of the
county in which the public way, ground, space,
building, structure, or utility is proposed to be
located; and such board shall have the power to
overrule such disapproval by a vote of not less
than a majority of its entire membership, and
upon such overruling said board or other official
in charge of proposed construction or authorization may proceed therewith; provided further,
however, that if the public way, ground, space,
building, strttcture, or utility be one the authorization or financing of which does not, under the
law governing the same, fall within the province
of the board of county commissioners or other
county official or bo·ard, then the submission to
the county planning commission shall be made.
by the body or official having such juris,diction,
and the saiJd planning commission's disapproval
may be overruled by s.aid body by a vote of not
less than a majority of its entire membership or
by said official. The acceptance, widening, removal, extension, relocation, narrowing, vacation,
abandonment, change of use, acquisition of land
for, or sale or lease of any road, park, or other
public 'vay, ground, place, property, or structure
shall be subject to sinrilar submission and approval, and the failure to approve 1nay be similarly overruled. The failure of the commission to act
within thirty days from and after the date of
official submission to it shall be deemed approval
unless a longer period be granted by the submitting board, body or official." (Emphasis added.)
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As pointed out by the appellant, this statutory provision has never been construed by this court. Further,
an exhaustive search discloses no available record of
the proceedings of the legislature from which its intention can be deter1nined. We are left, then, to determine
the intended application of this statute by a bare analysis of the words of the statute themselves. It is submitted
that the phrase "body or official" in ~Title 17-27-8, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended, must include state bodies, of which the
Utah Liquor Control Commission is one. The provisions
of Title 17-27-23 U.~c·.A., 1953, were obviously intended to
provide remedies for the violation of all the preceeding
sections of that chapter including Title 17-27-8, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended, and are therefore applicable to the
Liquor Control Commission.
For authority to the effect that the legislature can,
by specific statutory authorization, as here, make a
state agency amenable to zoning regulations see 61 ALR
2d, 970, Sec. 8, at page 987, which discusses that point and
begins with the following language:
"It has been recognized that a governmental
project may be made subject to zoning regulations
by the express authorization of the agency establishing it."
That annotation relies largely on the ca.se of Alabama
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. CiJty of Birmingham, 253 Ala. 402, 44 So. 2d 593, wherein the City of
Binningham pursuant to a statute authorizing zoning
of liquor stores by cities, threatened to enforce criminal
sanctions against the managers of certain liquor stores
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for the operation thereof in violation of local zoning
ordinances. In that case the court found the zoning ordinance invalid for reasons not p·ertinent here, but said at
page 598':
"While we recognize that the operation of
the liquor store is a governmental function, this
is no reason why the legislature cannot provide
that the liquor store may be included within a zoning ordinance. A liquor store is a place where
alcoholic beverages are placed on sale and sold to
customers as in other stores, and for this reason
from the standpoint of zoning could well be regarded as a business 'vithin the statute which authorizes a city to be divided into business, industrial and residential zones."

We do not agree 'vith appellant's conclusion that the
Liquor Control Commission is not within the definition
of a person, fir1n, or corporation. It is pointed out, however, that while the misdemeanor provision of Title 1727-23, U.C.A., 1953, apply to persons, firms and corporations, the other remedies in that same statute, including
the remedy of injunctive relief as here requested, do not
refer to persons, firms, or corporations.
Moreover, respondent submits that the buildings
in question are "public buildings" for the purposes of
Title 17-27-8, lT.C.A., 1953, for the reason that they are
used for public or quasi-public purposes, and as such are
subject to Salt Lake County zoning regulations. Public
buildings are defined in the case of Sharp et al v. Police
J1~;ry of Parish of East Baton Rouge, 194 La. 220, 193 So.
594, as follo·w·s :
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'~

'Public Building. In a narrow sense a "public building, is a building erPcte(1 and owned by
state, county or municipal authorities; a building
owned or controlled and held by the public authorities for public use~ a building belonging to,
or used by, the public for the transaction of public
or quasi-public business. As so defined the term
public building" includes a high school building,
a hospital, a jail, a town calaboose, or a common
schoolhouse.
H

''In a broader sense it is defined as a building, which, although privately owned, may be fairly deemed to promote a public purpose or to subserve a public use ; a building where the public
congregates in considerable numbers either for
amusement or for other purposes.' . . ." Citing 50
Corpus Juris, page 850 et seq.
Respondent submits that the building in question
is used for the transaction of public business and also as a
place open to the public wherein the public congregates.
POINT II
THE .APP AREN'T CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 32-1-28 AND TITLE 17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953,
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE LATTER, IT
BEING THE lVIOS'T RECENT EXPRESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE.

The lTtah Legislature enacted the Liquor Control
...\rt in 1935. (See Session La\Ys, 1935, Chapter 43.) The

present 'Tit1e

3~-1-28,

U.C.A., 1953, was included in the

Liquor Control _..\et of 1935, as Section 30 of Chapter 43,
Ses~~d on

La\YS, 1935.
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In 1941 the Utal1legislature delegated to the various
counties the power to zone. Title 17-27-23 U.C.A., 1953,
was originally enacted as Session Laws, 1941, Chapter 23,
Section 23.
Respondent submits that since Title 17-27-23, U.C.A.,
1953, is the latest pronouncement by the Utah legislature,
it should take precedence over Title 32-1-28, U.C.A., 1953,
insofar as this action is concerned. ·c·ertainly the Utah
legislature, in delegating the power to zone to the various
counties in 1941, and providing for injunctive relief for
violation of a county zoning ordinance and regulation,
was aware of the fact that the Utah Liquor Control Commission operated and would in the future operate stores
in the various counties. Were the legislature to exempt
state agencies, including the Liquor Control Commission
from the operation of Title 17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953, it could
have expressly done so and provided for such exemption
in the statute upon the premise that the Liquor ·Control
Commission enjoys sovereign immunity. Respondent submits that its failure to do so however, must be considered
as an indication that the legislature did not intend to exempt state agencies from the operation of Title 17-27-23,
U.C.A., 1953; and further that the Liquor Commission is
n'ot free from suit under this statute on the basis that it
enjoys sovereign immunity.
That the Liquor Control Commission does not enjoy
freedom from suit under the concept of sovereign immunity has been expressly declared by the Legislature
in Title 32-1-28, U.C.A., 1953. App·ellant contends, on
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pages ten and eleven of appellant's brief, that compliance
\rith this statute is 1nandatory for standing to sue, and
further that the statute is exclusive and provides the
only means \Vhereby the Liquor Control ·Commission
is subject to suit. Yet a liberal reading of the statute
does not carry with it such a restrictive meaning. !Title
32-1-28, 1T.C.A., 1953, provides that, ... "the tax commisRion ntay \Vith the \Vritten consent of the governor be
sued.... " If the legislature had intended to provide that
this statute establish the sole and exclusive means of
~uit, 'vords carrying that meaning would have been employed, such as the words "shall only," "upon condition
that" or "must." Howeve-r, words of this type are not
to be found, and the Legislature has instead used the
\vord ~'may" which, under the general rules of statutory
construction, is held to be directory and not mandatory.
(See Words and Phrases, Vol. 26A, "May-In Statutes,
.A.uthorizing Suits, page 428, citing Isom v. Rex Crude
Oil Co., 140 Cal. 678, 74 Pac. 294). To hold that the statute is exclusive \vould vest the Liquor Control Commission \vith the power to pick and choose the cases it would
defend, if any, and "rould give it the status of having
sovereign i1nn1unity, thereby rendering Title 32-1-28,
lT.-C.A., 1953, n1eaningless and of no import. This result,
re~pondent urges, \Vas not intended by the Legislature.
Respondent submits that the two statutes in question
are in direct conflict as to whether or not the appellant
is subject to suit, and if so, in what manner. Respondent
urges that the legislature in 19-±1 had knowledge of that
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portion of the Liquor Control Act here in question, (Title
32-1-28, U:c·.A., 1953) and as such could have exempted
the appellant frorn the operation of Title 17-27-23, U.C.A.,
1953. As was stated in the case of Hudson Furniture
Co. 1J. Freed Furniture & Carpet Co., 10 Utah 31, 36 Pac.
132, 133:
"It is clear that the two sections are repugnant to each other in this respect, and, as section
3918 is the latest expression of our legislature,
it must prevail; and in so far as the two statutes
are repugnant to each other, the former is re~
pealed by the latter by implication. The fact that
the former is not expressly repealed by the latter,
and is our regular statute of frauds, as insisted
by counsel for appellant, makes no difference....
Both statutes must be construed together, and
given effect as far as possible, for both are pre~
sumed to have been enacted \vith deliberation,
and with a lmowledge of all existing la\vs on that
subject." Citing Sutherland Statutory Construction, Sections 152, 160, and cases.
Further, the Utah Supreme Court stated in the case
of In Re Gannett, 11 Utah 283, 39 Pac. 496, 497:
"The repeal by implication results from an
enactment the terms of \Yhich are in conflict with
an earlier act, and the necessary operation of
which cannot be han11onized \vith the necessary
effect of the later la"T· In such case the last expression of the legislative "Till n1ust prevail." Citing Sutherland Statutory Construction, Section
138, and cases.
Although respondent does not contend that Title 3~1-28 U.C.A., 1953, is repealed by implication, respondent
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does submit that the latest pronouncement of the Legislature controls for the purposes of this suit. As such,
respondent need not comply with the provisions of Title
32-1-28 U.C.A., 1953, in order to maintain its action, but
the appellant is subject to suit under Title 17-27-23,
U.C.A., 1953.
POINT III
HAVING FAILED TO CO,MPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED, THE
USE OF THE LAND AND BUILDINGS IN QUES'TION BY
THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS ENJOINABLE,
AND THE TRIAL COURT RULING DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS RESPONDENT'S COMPLAIN'T HEREIN SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

The Legislature in Title 17-27-8, U. C.A., 1953, as
amended, has provided a clear procedure wherein the
county planning commission and other political bodies,
including the Liquor ·Control Commission, can express
their intents and desires concerning land use to the end
that said bodies can coop·erate to serve the people whom
they both represent, and has left the decision in the end
to the body most concerned with the problem. Appellant
has fully ignored this procedure. It has neither requested
approval of its location of the planning commission nor
has it, so far as this record shows, taken a vote of its
membership to overrule the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission. It now asks this court to say that because
it has wholly ignored the planning commission and these
statutory provisions, we should now infer a compliance
"Tith the provisions of Title 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, as
amended, from this conduct. But this lack of recognition
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is the very matter of which the county now complains.
Had the same result obtained after compliance with the
statute, the county would not and could not now complain.
We now request this court to require specific compliance
with that statute to the end that the ~c·ounty Planning
Commission can at least advise appellant of its deciSion,
and the appellant can then make its determination to
comply with, or· overrule, the Planning Commission. In
this action it is not respondent's intent or desire to encroach upon or interfere with the sovereign power of the
state of Utah. However, it is respondent's intent torequire the Liquor Control Commission, as an agency and
creature of the state, to comply with the laws of this
state, to-wit: Title 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
POINT IV
THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION kCTS IN A PROPRIETARY RATHER THAN A GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY, AND IS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO ZONING REGULATIONS.

Respondent recognizes that the ,,~eight of authority
favors the determination that the Liquor Control Commission acts in a governmental capacity. Se·e 121 ALR
300 and 9 ALR 2d 1292. It is suggested ho,vever, that
this determination has been made largely to support the
constitutionality of the act as against the contention
that it is a monopolistic invasion of private enterprise.
The ease of Utah ;,llfrs.' Ass'n. v. Steu~art., 82 Utah 198,
23 Pac. 2d 229, is an exan1ple of this determination, as
are many of the cases in the annotations cited above.. On
the other hand, the operation of the liquor con1mission
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has many characteristics of a typical private business
enterprise. It operates for a profit; it operates in general
as a retail store serving the public at large. In this regard it should be noted that the expansion of its operation in question here represents not an effort to control
or limit liquor consumption, but in fact encourages it.
In this respect the commission has reacted much as a
private entrepreneur desiring to increase its

salP~.

It is submitted now for your consideration that for
purposes of a1nenability to zoning regulation, and possibly for purposes of tort liability, the op·eration of retail
liquor stores by the Liquor Control Commission should
be determined to be a proprietary functi'on.
Under the view of respondent herein, this determination would not change the net result of this case, inasmuch as Title 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, would still apply.
It should be noted, however, that if it is determined that
in the operati'on of its retail liquor stores the Liquor 'Control Commission acts in a proprietary capacity, and at
the same time that the provisions ·of Title 17-27-8, U.C.A.,

1953, as amended, are not applicable as contended in part
by appellant, then the result should be that the Liquor
Control Commission would be barred from op·erating
in conflict with county zoning ordinances according to
the view that proprietary functions of political bodies
are subject to zoning regulations. See 61 ALR 2d 970.
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CON,CLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, respondent submits
that the trial court did not commit error in denying appellant's motion to dismiss. Respondent respectfully
requests that this court affirm the decision of the District
Court and allow this matter to be tried on the merits.

GROVER A. GILE.S
Salt Lake County

Atto~ney

GERALD E. NIELSON,
Deputy, Civil DiviJsvon
Attorneys for Respondent
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